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Raymond Shih Ray Ku* 
ABSTRACT 
In 2007, the United Nations adopted the Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expression 
(CCD) with the goal of creating an environment that encourages 
individuals and social groups to create, distribute, and have access 
to diverse cultural expression from their own cultural and from 
cultures around the world. With regard to domestic and 
international efforts to implement the CCD and reconcile its goals 
with other international norms, the author argues that valuable 
lessons can be learned from current trends and issues in U.S. 
copyright law.  Specifically, the author argues that the current 
debate over copyright’s response to new technologies in general 
and how best to promote and protect musical expression in a 
digital and networked world illustrate the importance of 
disaggregating the interests of creators and distributors.  
Depending upon the funding mechanism chosen for creation, legal 
protection for distributors may undermine the goals of the CCD 
leading to fewer works being created, disseminated, and made 
accessible to the public. 
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I. INTRODUCTION 
As evidenced by this symposium and many others like it around the 
world, the protection of cultural expression has become an increasingly 
important matter of public policy. Not only are conflicts over the legal 
protections afforded to expression serious domestic problems, they have 
become global sources of controversy as well – especially in the context of 
trade negotiation and regulation. This paper focuses on copyright law and 
policy as it is currently being shaped in the United States. One may ask 
what U.S. law and policy have to do with the United Nations Convention 
on the Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions 
(CCD) and its relationship with the World Trade Organization (WTO). The 
answer is simple. First, the CCD does not identify how cultural expression 
should be promoted or protected, and with respect to music, literature, film, 
and other creative works that fall within the CCD’s definition of cultural 
expression,1 copyright law, with its emphasis on exclusive rights to such 
works, has been an important, if not the dominant, model for promoting 
and protecting such expression since England adopted the Statute of Anne. 
Moreover, it can no longer be said that copyright is simply a Western 
model. This is especially true as the U.S. increasingly uses trade 
negotiations and international trade organizations such as the WTO to 
export U.S. intellectual property policy around the world. Consequently, 
understanding the promise and limits of U.S. copyright law and policy will 
help us to appreciate the source of current intellectual property and trade 
flash points and to better understand how to achieve the CCD’s goal of 
creating an environment which encourages individuals and social groups: 
(a) to create, produce, disseminate, distribute and have 
access to their own cultural expressions, paying due attention to 
the special circumstances and needs of women as well as 
various social groups including persons belonging to minorities 
and indigenous peoples; 
(b) to have access to diverse cultural expressions from 
within their territory as well as from other countries of the 
world.2 
In light of these goals, it is fair to ask whether copyright law, and in 
particular, copyright’s creation of exclusive rights in cultural expression, is 
the best model for sustaining such an environment. 
                                                 
1  See United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, Convention on the 
Protection and Promotion of the Diversity of Cultural Expressions, art. 4, Mar 18, 2007 . 
2 See id. art. 7.1. 
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As I have written elsewhere, one of the fundamental problems 
associated with copyright law today is the need to differentiate between the 
interests of the creators of cultural works and those who were responsible 
for distributing those works to the public.3 In other words, whose interests 
does copyright law protect? Or, whom does copyright law protect? For 
most of copyright’s history, the interests of creators and distributors were 
considered one and the same, and for the most part, were largely aligned 
with those of the public or audience. However, new technologies, 
especially digital technology have always challenged a legal regime created 
in response to a specific technology and means of distribution – the printing 
press.4 Once unbundled, the assumption that the exclusive rights created by 
copyright serve the interests of creators, distributors, and the public 
becomes less clear. Many of the copyright controversies making headlines 
today, from the litigation and threats of litigation against Grokster, 
Google’s Books Project, MySpace, and YouTube, among others, involve 
copyright owners attempting to use copyright to prevent the emergence of 
new distribution models and uses of their works. In other words, the 
middlemen of old are using copyright to preserve their status in a world in 
which many of these middlemen are not only unnecessary but also stifle an 
environment for creating, producing, and disseminating diverse cultural 
expression. I highlight the distributor/creator dichotomy because any 
discussion of extending intellectual property protection in the context of 
global trade must recognize precisely what interests are being protected and 
promoted. As such, we must look beyond the rhetoric of “piracy” and 
evaluate the underlying merits of copyright claims and calls for its 
expansion. 
Obviously, how to best create an environment for the creation and 
dissemination of cultural expression is an important question for both 
international and domestic law. More importantly, however, the choices we 
make will shape the future of human creativity and our collective access to 
creative works. In this respect, we have two very clear choices. The first is 
very much like the world to which we are currently accustomed. 
Individuals create expression and large companies distribute those works to 
the public at a price based upon legally created exclusive rights. The price 
we pay for obtaining access to those works, however, goes beyond the 
dollars and cents that come out of our pockets. Under this model, we pay 
another price in the form of access to fewer works either because we are 
                                                 
3 See generally Raymond Shih Ray Ku, The Creative Destruction of Copyright: Napster & the New 
Economics of Digital Technology, 69 U. CHI. L. REV. 263 (2002) [hereinafter Creative 
Destruction]; Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Consumer Copying & Creative Destruction: Fair Use 
beyond Market Failure, 18 BERK. TECH. L. J. 539 (2003) [hereinafter Consumer Copying]; 
Raymond Shih Ray Ku, Grokking Grokster, 2005 WIS. L. REV. 1217 (2005). 
4 See Ku, Grokking Grokster, supra note 3, at 1265-70. 
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unable or unwilling to pay, or because the distributor decides that some 
works are not appropriate or worthy. 
In contrast, the combination of the Internet and digital technologies 
create an opportunity for countless individuals who would not otherwise 
have been able to express themselves to create in ways yet to be imagined. 
The personal computer and editing software make it possible for anyone to 
become their own publisher, recording studio, or even film studio. 
Likewise, many of these same technologies make it possible for individuals 
to obtain access to creative works that they would not have had access to 
before as the collective individuals connected to the Internet become 
distributors of digital works. In other words, today’s technology allows 
anyone with access to a computer to become an author, recording artist, or 
filmmaker while at the same time holds the potential for providing 
everyone connected to the Internet with access to the collective creative 
expression of the world. This “world” or model is not without its 
challenges, not the least of which is how best to compensate creators when 
the law no longer grants them exclusive rights to control the reproduction, 
distribution, and use of their works. Let me emphasize that this choice will 
not be dictated by technology. Just the opposite, as Ithiel de Sola Pool 
observed, technology “shapes the structure of the battle, but not every 
outcome.”5 We must choose the model, and that choice will shape the 
technology to come. 
II. FIRST PRINCIPLES 
Before we can evaluate calls for expanding copyright protection, 
particularly in response to changes in technology, a short summary of 
copyright is in order. Historically, copyright is derived from the monopoly 
privileges enjoyed by the Stationers Company in England, and the British 
Statute of Anne.6 Originally, this monopoly privilege was used to suppress 
competition and free expression.7 Despite its questionable origins and the 
fact that it maintains some of its original characteristics, copyright exists 
today for decidedly different reasons. In the United States, the U.S. 
Constitution empowers Congress, “[t]o promote the Progress of Science 
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.”8 With regard 
to music, books, and movies, Congress has chosen to promote progress 
                                                 
5 ITHIEL DE SOLA POOL, TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM 251 (1983). 
6 See PAUL GOLDSTEIN, COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX 
26-40 (2005). 
7 Id. 
8 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
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through the law of copyright9 which grants authors certain exclusive rights 
in their works including, as the name describes, the right to copy.10 As the 
Constitution provides, copyright does not protect a natural right of authors 
in their works, though it is influenced by the fact that content is produced 
by the author’s labor.11 Instead, copyright law represents a bargain between 
the public and the author in which the public grants authors certain 
exclusive rights in exchange for access to their creations. This access takes 
two forms: access to the work during the period of exclusive rights on 
terms generally dictated by the author or her assigns; and unfettered access 
to the work after those exclusive rights have expired. 
This bargain is considered necessary because works of authorship share 
some of the characteristics of a public good. Public goods are generally 
defined by two traits: they are non-rivalrous, meaning that “it is possible at 
                                                 
9 See 17 U.S.C. § 102 (1996) (listing the types of works protected by copyright). 
10 See 17 U.S.C. § 106 (1996). Section 106 of the Copyright Act provides: 
 
[T]he owner of copyright under this title has the exclusive rights to do and to 
authorize any of the following: 
to reproduce the copyrighted work in copies or phonorecords; 
to prepare derivative works based upon the copyrighted works; 
to distribute copies or phonorecords of the copyrighted work to the public by sale or 
other transfer of ownership, or by rental, lease, or lending; 
in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
motion pictures and other audiovisual works, to perform the copyrighted work 
publicly; 
in the case of literary, musical, dramatic, and choreographic works, pantomimes, and 
pictorial, graphic, or sculptural works, including the individual images of a motion 
picture or other audiovisual work, to display the copyrighted work publicly; and 
in the case of sound recordings, to perform the copyrighted work publicly by means of 
a digital audio transmission. 
 
11 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). It states: 
 
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are neither unlimited nor 
primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather the limited grant is a 
means by which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is intended to 
motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special 
reward, and to allow the public access to the products of their genius after the limited 
period of exclusive control has expired. 
 
See also Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340, 349 (1991) (“The primary 
objective of copyright is not to reward the labor of authors, but “[t]o promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts.”); Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, 219 (1954) (recognizing the “economic 
philosophy" behind copyright); United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, 158 (1948) 
(“Copyright law … makes reward to the owner a secondary consideration."). See Wendy J. Gordon, 
A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of Intellectual 
Property, 102 YALE L.J. 1533 passim (1993) (arguing for a natural law justification for protecting 
intellectual property); see generally Alfred C. Yen, Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as Labor 
and Possession, 51 OHIO ST. L. J. 517 (1990) (discussing the rejection of an absolute property right 
in intellectual property under Anglo-American law, and proposing an alternative interpretation of 
natural law). 
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no cost for additional persons to enjoy the same unit of a public good”;12 
and non-exclusive, meaning it is difficult to prevent people from enjoying 
the good. Thomas Jefferson described the public goods nature of ideas 
when he wrote: 
 
If nature has made any one thing less susceptible than all others 
of exclusive property, it is the action of the thinking power 
called an idea . . . . [T]he moment it is divulged, it forces itself 
into the possession of everyone, and the receiver cannot 
dispossess himself of it. Its peculiar character, too, is that no one 
possesses the less, because every other possesses the whole of 
it.13  
 
Jefferson considered these traits beneficial because “[h]e who receives 
an idea from me, receives instruction himself without lessening mine; as he 
who lights his taper at mine, receives light without darkening me.”14  
Today, we tend to be more cautious about these traits, even skeptical, 
because while they facilitate the widespread dissemination of ideas, they 
also subject public goods to “free riding.” In other words, the non-rivalrous 
and non-exclusive characteristics of a public good increase the likelihood 
that some people will enjoy the benefits of the good without internalizing 
the costs of its production.15 If the funding of public goods is left to the 
market, free riding may lead to underproduction of the good. As Professor 
Gordon notes, “[i]f the creators of intellectual productions were given no 
rights to control the use made of their works, they might receive few 
revenues and thus would lack an appropriate level of incentive to create.”16 
Likewise, “[f]ewer resources would be devoted to intellectual productions 
than their social merit would warrant.”17 Unauthorized copying, therefore, 
may reduce the incentives for creating and distributing works of cultural 
expression. 
Astute readers will note that, while the preceding description of public 
goods may describe ideas, songs, or poetry, it does not precisely describe 
CDs, DVD’s, books, or sculptures. While ideas may be non-exclusive, I 
can certainly keep people from reading my book or listening to my CD. As 
                                                 
12  See, e.g., RONALD V. BETTIG, COPYRIGHTING CULTURE: THE POLITICAL ECONOMY OF 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 79-81 (1996); Harold Demsetz, The Private Production of Public Goods, 
13 J. L. & ECON. 293, 295 (1970); William W. Fisher III, Reconstructing the Fair Use Doctrine, 
101 HARV. L. REV. 1659, 1661 (1988). 
13 SAUL K. PADOVER, THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON 1011, 1015 (1943) (quoting letter from Thomas 
Jefferson to Isaac McPherson, Aug 13, 1813). 
14 Id. 
15 See Wendy Gordon, Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural and Economic Analysis of the 
Betamax Case and Its Predecessors, 82 COLUM. L. REV. 1600, 1611 (1982). 
16 Id. at 1610. 
17 Id. 
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such, the CD is a private good. 18  Nonetheless, we have traditionally 
protected not only the song, but the CD as well. The justifications for this 
protection are the obvious public benefits of embodying works of 
authorship in a tangible medium and the threat that copying poses to the 
initial distributor. While a song or story may spread by word of mouth, 
fixing those works in tangible form facilitates the dissemination of those 
works to larger portions of the public while preserving the artist's original 
expression. However, once copies are available, it is usually inexpensive 
for subsequent users to copy the work. If competition from copiers drives 
the price of a work down to the marginal costs of the copier, it threatens the 
incentives to distribute the work in the first place.19 If distributors have no 
incentive to make new works available, the public's access to those works 
will be significantly reduced. In other words, even though a CD or book is 
a private good, copying still threatens the markets for these goods because 
their content is so easily disseminated. 
Copyright, therefore, is designed not only to promote the creation of 
cultural works, but to promote their distribution as well. Traditionally, this 
has been accomplished by granting the creators of works a bundle of 
legally enforceable rights in their works similar to property rights in 
tangible property. Copyright owners utilize these rights to control copying, 
distribution, and other uses of the protected works. For instance, the author 
can assign or license the right to distribute to a distributor, which serves to 
protect the interests of both the author and the distributor. Granting 
copyright holders exclusive rights promotes a private market by artificially 
creating scarcity and exclusivity in works that would otherwise be public 
goods. 
Copyright, however, is not without its costs. Because copyrights are 
exclusive, the law creates some of the same market distortions as a 
monopoly. One of the most important distortions is the ability to charge 
“monopoly” prices or prices that are higher than would otherwise exist in a 
competitive market. While there is some competition from similar works to 
temper monopoly pricing of copyrighted works, this competition is 
imperfect because Finding Nemo simply is not Casablanca or even The 
Little Mermaid, and Bach is not Mozart. If one wants to enjoy a specific 
work or artist, one must pay the copyright holder’s price. Because these 
prices are higher than competitive prices, some people who would 
                                                 
18 See BETTIG, supra note 12, at 80. 
19 See LAWRENCE LESSIG, THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED 
WORLD 153 (2001); William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright 
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 326 (1989); see also Am. Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 
913, 927 (2d Cir. 1994) (“Ultimately, the monopoly privileges conferred by copyright protection 
and the potential financial rewards there from are not directly serving to motivate authors to write 
individual articles; rather, they serve to motivate publishers to produce journals, which provide the 
conventional and often exclusive means for disseminating these individual articles.”). 
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otherwise have paid the competitive price will be excluded because they are 
unable or unwilling to pay the monopoly price. In general, we consider this 
deadweight loss acceptable because without copyright, fewer works would 
be created and fewer people would enjoy them. 
The monopoly problems associated with copyright are further 
compounded when one recognizes that this model gives tremendous power 
to distributors. While copyright initially vests its exclusive rights in 
creators, these rights are routinely assigned away to the distributor of the 
work in order to gain access to the channels of distribution and their 
audience. 20  Unless an author has significant bargaining power, which 
typically occurs only after achieving a degree of commercial success, 
distributors set the terms and determine which works will be made 
available to the public. As such, the distributors of cultural expression 
whether record labels, film studios, cable operators, or Internet service 
providers have significant power to “censor” cultural expression even if 
that censorship is simply based upon the judgment of executives as to 
whether a work will be commercially successful. Obviously, the 
distributors’ decisions may not perfectly reflect the preferences of the 
market let alone the collective members of the public (to the disadvantage 
of unknown artists, works that do not reflect mainstream taste, and the 
public). As such, many creative works specifically highlighted for 
promotion under the CCD are not created or distributed because of the 
business judgments of distributors. Once again, these costs are considered 
acceptable because distributors largely shoulder the financial risk of turning 
stories into books and motion pictures, songs into records, and unknown 
artists into superstars. The question remains, however, whether this old 
world order should continue in a digital world. 
III. THE DIGITAL WORLD ORDER 
By this point, we are all quite familiar with the characteristics of digital 
technology at the root of the information revolution. At the heart of this 
revolution is the ability to reduce information to binary digits. Unlike 
traditional analog, print, or video, in which music, writings, and images 
respectively were captured and conveyed as physical representations of 
what was recorded, digital technology reproduces those same sights, 
sounds, and words as numbers.21 The widespread adoption of technologies 
                                                 
20 See Neil Weinstock Netanel, Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our System of Free Expression, 
53 VAND. L. REV. 1879, 1889 (2000) (observing that “those seeking to reach a mass audience will 
need to do so through conglomerate-controlled outlets”). 
21  See COMMITTEE ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS AND THE EMERGING INFORMATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE, NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, THE DIGITAL DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL 
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that make digitization of expression has significant implications for the 
creation and distribution of creative works. 
By reducing information to ones and zeros, digital representation 
revolutionizes the characteristics of content. First, digital representation 
frees content from the need for a tangible medium to distribute it. In the 
past, content could be conveyed to the public only through physical media 
such as film, paper, plastic, etc., and the physical media limited its 
distribution and copying. Distributing copyrighted works in the form of 
books, CDs, and videos is similar to the distribution of wine.22 In order to 
distribute wine to the public, one needed bottles. Even if wine was plentiful, 
bottles were not. In contrast, the data representing a recent hit song, a 
newborn's picture, or a scholar's work in progress no longer need to be 
carried in plastic or on paper. Digital information can be conveyed without 
the need for a bottle.23 Reduced to ones and zeros, digital information can 
be transmitted through the radio waves of the electromagnetic spectrum, as 
electrical impulses through telephone and cable wires, and as light across 
fiber optic networks with the information alone traveling to the recipient.24 
To the extent that one desires permanently to bottle digital information for 
either transportation or storage, one can preserve it across media ranging 
from computer hard drives to CDs, memory sticks, and even iPods.  
Another revolutionary characteristic of digital reproduction is the 
ability to make perfect copies. An analog recording of a CD, radio 
broadcast, or a photocopy of a book is not the same as the original, and the 
quality of subsequent copies continue to degrade. In contrast, digital copies 
are identical to the original digital master.25 A digital copy can therefore be 
used to produce countless subsequent digital copies, all identical to the 
original.26  
                                                                                                            
PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION AGE 28-29 (National Academy 2000); see also INFORMATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL INFORMATION 
INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS   
12 (1995) (“White Paper”) (“Any two-dimensional work can be readily 'digitized'－i.e., translated 
into a digital code (usually a series of zeros and ones).”). 
22  See John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas (1994), 
http://www.wired.com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html (last visited Aug 20, 2007) 
(analogizing copyright to the distribution of wine in bottles). 
23 While the Internet eliminates the need for the bottle, there may still be significant value in 
making old bottles. For example, while a digital book may be a less expensive, more versatile 
product compared to a hardbound edition, the two are not perfect substitutes. Many people may 
prefer the tactile sensation of paper and leather to reading on a computer screen or handheld device. 
Similarly, there will still be markets for compact discs in the foreseeable future given the ubiquity 
of compact disc players, the convenience of purchasing rather than burning discs, the reliability of 
the data stored on purchased CDs, and the selection of music on CDs. 
24 See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 21, at 32-33. In this respect, digital information 
shares the same characteristics with analog information. 
25 Id. 
26 Id. 
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Digital technology also changes the economics of copying. Unlike the 
manufacturing of bottles or books, copying digital information is both 
inexpensive and simple. Reduced to ones and zeros, information can be 
copied by any home computer and stored on the hard drive or a CD in 
minutes or seconds. Consequently, to copy an entire encyclopedia 
collection, one no longer needs to have the financial resources to invest in 
printing presses, warehouses, and employees to reproduce each volume, 
when the entire collection can be copied and stored so easily. Combined 
with the Internet, digital reproduction makes it possible for every home 
computer to make and distribute perfect copies worldwide at billions of bits 
per second.27 The only costs of becoming a global distributor (or pirate) of 
digital content are the price of a computer, Internet access, and electricity. 
Combined, the characteristics and economics of digital reproduction 
eliminate some of the most important obstacles to copying. Traditionally, 
the investments needed to reproduce and distribute content in a physical 
form, the physical form itself, and the poor quality of reproductions 
deterred copying.28 The size of the investment needed to make bottles and 
distribute those bottles limited the number of copiers. Likewise, the 
physical bottles made it possible to find and seize copies, and the quality of 
copies made them less than perfect substitutes.29 These obstacles were the 
natural outgrowth of the way in which content was distributed and the 
economics associated with distribution. Digital technology is not bound by 
these restraints. 
The digital music experience illustrates the impact of digital 
technology on the copying and distribution of content. A typical song can 
be digitally recorded and then stored as an MP3 file approximately three 
megabytes in size with CD quality sound. 30 The music either can be saved 
as an MP3 directly by an artist or can be converted from a CD. The music 
file can then be distributed quickly and easily to others over the Internet 
through World Wide Web pages, posted in newsgroups, shared in chat 
rooms, or attached to e-mail.31 Once downloaded from the Internet, a user 
                                                 
27 See id. at 38; see also INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE, supra note 21, at 12 (noting 
that the Internet “makes it possible for one individual, with a few key strokes, to deliver perfect 
copies of digitized works to scores of other individuals－or to upload a copy to a bulletin board or 
other service where thousands of individuals can download it or print unlimited 'hard' copies”). 
28  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 21, at 32-33 (“For every form of digital 
information, every copy is as good as the original and can therefore be the source of additional 
perfect copies, which greatly reduces what was once a natural impediment to copyright 
infringement.”). 
29  See id. at 32 (noting that the copy quality decreases with each successive generation of a 
“traditional form” of information). 
30 See Ku, Creative Destruction, supra note 3, at 272. 
31  See NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL, supra note 21, at 78; INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE 
TASK FORCE, supra note 21, at 12 (noting that the establishment of “electronic systems makes it 
possible for one individual, with a few key strokes, to deliver perfect copies of digitized works to 
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can save MP3s on a computer's hard drive, burn them onto a blank CD, or 
save them on some other storage device. 
Napster, Grokster, BitTorrent, and other peer-to-peer networks 
facilitate the distribution of digital content by allowing individuals not only 
to search for MP3s on the Web, but also to search for MP3s and other files 
stored on other people's hard drives. 32  As such, p2p networking 
dramatically expands the universe of available music. Before p2p, music 
and other content were only available if someone posted the content to a 
centralized computer server represented by a web page or newsgroup or 
attached it to an e-mail. Peer-to-peer networking streamlines the 
distribution process by making information residing on a user’s computer 
hard drive directly available to other users of the network. Using a peer-to-
peer network, an individual who has recorded a favorite CD onto her 
computer's hard drive need only log on to the network to make those songs 
available to millions of others to download. 
The ease and popularity of peer-to-peer networking is illustrated by 
their growth even during Napster’s and Grokster’s well-publicized lawsuits, 
and the Recording Industry Association of America’s much publicized 
effort to bring lawsuits against tens of thousands of individual p2p users.33 
According to the research firm BigChampagne, in the United States, 6.9 
Million people were simultaneously logged onto p2p networks at any given 
time. This was up from 5.5 Million in 2004 and 3.2 Million in 2003. 
Globally, 9.5 Million users were logged on at the same time in 2005, up 
from 7.56 Million in 2006 and 5.6 Million in 2003. More recently, social 
networking sites such as MySpace and FaceBook and video sharing sites 
such as YouTube have eclipsed p2p use with YouTube reaching a monthly 
audience of approximately 20 Million unique visitors in 2006. 34 
Nonetheless, copyright issues remain because these services allow users to 
upload digital files including copyrighted music and videos making them 
available to millions of online users. 
Not only has technology made it easier to copy music, it has also 
dramatically reduced the costs of copying. When I first wrote on this topic 
in 2001, for less than $900, one could purchase a home computer with a 
high-speed processor, forty gigabyte hard drive, and CD-RW drive capable 
                                                                                                            
scores of other individuals”); KIERSTEN CONNER-SAX & Ed Krol, THE WHOLE INTERNET: THE 
NEXT GENERATION 361 (1999). 
32 See generally Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 2764 (2005). 
33 See http://www.eff.org/IP/P2P/riaa-v-thepeople.php (last visited Aug 20, 2007) (collective legal 
documents and information related to these suits). 
34 According to a 2006 study, web traffic to sites such as YouTube accounted for 46% of network 
traffic with YouTube alone accounting for nearly 10% of all Internet traffic. In contrast, p2p usage 
accounted for 36% of total network traffic. See HTTP Overtakes P2P Traffic, 
http://www.dslreports.com/shownews/85022. 
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of burning CDs for less than $900.35 Blank CDs with a storage capacity of 
seven hundred megabytes could be purchased for approximately $0.40 each. 
Depending upon the speed, users could obtain Internet access for free or by 
paying up to $40 per month. A single CD could hold approximately twenty 
albums worth of music, and the hard drive could hold over one thousand 
albums. Under these circumstances, the marginal cost for a user to 
download or copy an MP3 is effectively zero.36 Since then, prices for both 
computer and storage technology have only continued to fall. In 2007, one 
can purchase a Mac mini with a 60 gigabyte hard drive, and a drive capable 
of burning CDs and DVDs for $600.37 To many involved in the copyright 
industry, the Internet’s potential for distributing content through p2p 
networks or other online services and the reduced costs of copying 
represent the dark side of digital technology. Unbounded by the restraints 
of brick-and-mortar economics, anyone with a computer and Internet 
access is now a potential copier and distributor of music. 
IV. A NEW WORLD ORDER? 
In the United States, copyright protection is justified solely as an 
incentive for the creation and distribution of content. As discussed in Part II, 
the protection of music, literary works, and other content is not based upon 
the moral or natural rights of authors.38 Instead, copyright exists to ensure 
that content will not be under produced as a result of the public-good 
characteristics of intellectual property.39 The artificial scarcity created by 
copyright is justified to the extent that the incentives it creates are needed 
to make works available to the public. This means that if adequate financial 
incentives or market conditions exist to inspire the creative activity of 
authors and encourage them to make their works available to the public 
without copyright, copyright protection should not be recognized.40 
Today, the economics of digital technology renders copyright both 
unnecessary and inefficient. In general, discussions about the optimal level 
                                                 
35 See Ku, Creative Destruction, supra note 3, at 273-74. 
36 Id. at 274. 
37 See http://www.Apple.com/macmini/ (last visited Aug 20, 2007).  
38 See Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, supra note 11, at 429. 
39 See Part II. 
40 See Glynn S. Lunney Jr., Reexamining Copyright’s Incentive-Access Paradigm, 49 VAND. L, 
REV. 483, 487-88 (1996) (noting that overbroad copyright protection imposes a cost represented by 
“the lost value society would have associated with alternative investments to which these resources 
would otherwise have been devoted”); Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 332 (recognizing that 
“beyond some level copyright protection may actually be counterproductive by raising the cost of 
expression”); see Stephen Breyer, The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study of Copyright in Books, 
Photocopies, and Computer Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281, 322 (1970) (arguing that copyright's 
protection of books is not justified). 
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of copyright protection ignore distinctions between the incentives for 
creation and distribution.41  In part, the bundling of these interests was 
strategic. Distributors found that it was to their political advantage to have 
their interests treated as inseparable from the interests of creators.42  In 
addition to the rhetorical power of equating the interests of distributors with 
creators, until now the bundling of interests was acceptable because the 
cost of producing the vessels – CDs, books, and DVDs – for content, and 
distributing those vessels, was an essential component of making content 
available to the public. As a result, both sets of costs had to be considered if 
the public was to enjoy and have access to the products of human 
creativity.43 However, as the following demonstrates, because the Internet 
and digital technology have revolutionized the ways in which we 
disseminate information, it is no longer appropriate to treat these interests 
as interchangeable. Once they are unbundled, it becomes clear that 
copyright protection cannot be justified as a means of ensuring distribution 
and is an impermissibly inefficient means for ensuring creation.  
A. Distribution 
Digital technology and P2P networks represent a challenge to 
copyright because the economics of creation and distribution may no longer 
reflect the economic realities of today's technology.44 If so, copyright and 
the costs associated with copyright may no longer be justified. Consider 
what copyright owners such as the RIAA fear: digital technology enables 
individuals to make an unlimited number of perfect copies of sound 
recordings at virtually no cost. Because each copy is identical to the 
original, each is a perfect substitute for the original. Once a copy is 
available on the Internet, anyone connected to the Internet may obtain a 
copy (once again, at virtually no cost) to listen to once, to keep 
permanently, or to take with him or her and enjoy on any number of 
                                                 
41 See Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 327 (“To simplify the analysis, we ignore any distinction 
between costs incurred by authors and by publishers, and therefore use the term ‘author’ (or 
‘creator’) to mean both author and publisher.”); Breyer, supra note 40, at 292  (focusing primarily 
on the costs of publishing). 
42  As developed in England, the efforts of booksellers to obtain copyright were initially 
unsuccessful until they tied their interests to the interests of writers. See BETTIG, supra note 12, at 
15-19 (noting that copyright originally developed to serve the interests of printers--authors still had 
to rely upon patronage); Stewart E. Sterk, Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 94 MICH L REV 
1197, 1197-98 (1996) (challenging the rhetoric claiming that copyright expansion is in authors' best 
interests); GOLDSTEIN, supra note 6, at 41-44 (discussing how printers secured copyright 
protection in England for their own interests); Yen, supra note 11, at 525-26. See JAMES BOYLE, 
SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS : LAW AND THE 
CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY , at 81 (1997) (discussing the use of the “romantic 
author” to justify copyright protection). 
43 See Landes & Posner, supra note 19, at 326-27. 
44 See Ku, Creative Destruction, supra note 3, at 300. 
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devices. “Low costs, combined with the ease of distributing and finding 
content through Napster and other online technologies, mean that content is 
capable of spreading over the Internet like an unstoppable viral outbreak, or, 
to borrow a phrase from Thomas Jefferson: a ‘fire expandable over all 
space.’”45 This is of course the RIAA's worst nightmare: if music were 
freely available, why would anyone pay them for it? In contrast, from the 
public's perspective and the perspective of copyright policy, this may be 
ideal. The preceding is not an example of free riding that leads to market 
failure but an example of technological innovations curing market failure. 
By purchasing computers, Internet access, and storage media, members of 
the public bear the full cost of distribution and become distributors 
themselves. “From the perspective of intellectual property theory, this is 
revolutionary because content can now be disseminated to consumers 
without the need for anyone other than consumers to invest in 
distribution.”46 Because the public builds and maintains the distribution 
channels and mechanisms for distributing digital content, once a work is 
created, with a few clicks of a mouse anyone connected to the Internet may 
enjoy that work. As Internet access grows, eventually, the entire public may 
enjoy that work. Under these circumstances, enforcing exclusive rights to 
reproduce and distribute works would mean that fewer, not more, people 
would have access to the work. While copyright may have increased the 
availability of creative works in the age of the printing press, in today's 
digital world, copyright results in under distribution. 
B. Creation 
Distribution, however, is only half of the copyright equation. The 
revolution in distribution would do little good if there were nothing to 
distribute (or if there were nothing new to distribute). While digital 
technology and the Internet may make CD distributors unnecessary, music 
still suffers from the problems associated with public goods, and we still 
want people to create and perform music. “Once unbundled from 
distribution, however, copyright's role in promoting creation by prohibiting 
consumer copying is neither clear nor absolute.” 47  Copyright’s role is 
unclear because it is difficult to determine what impact, if any, file sharing 
has on the actual incentives available to creators. Arguably, because 
problems associated with distributing public goods were considered 
                                                 
45 Id. 
46 Id. at 301. 
47  Ku, Consumer Copying, supra note 3, at 566. This is partly due to the fact that, as with 
distribution, digital technology reduces the costs of creation, lowering the financial investments 
necessary for creators to create the original digital master copy. Cost reduction, however, is not the 
most compelling challenge to copyright. See Ku, Creative Destruction, supra note 3, at 305-06. 
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comparable regardless of whether one was distributing books, records, or 
DVDs, copyright policy generally assumed that restrictions against 
unauthorized reproduction and distribution should be expanded beyond 
their original purpose – promoting book publishing – to other creative 
endeavors despite differences in the markets for such works. This 
assumption generally ignored or discounted the fact that some of these 
endeavors did not suffer from the inability to exclude nonpayers from 
enjoying the underlying work. For example, while Stephen King may have 
difficulty excluding nonpayers from enjoying a published novel, 
Shakespeare, or more importantly, the owner of the Globe theater who 
commissioned Shakespeare’s play, certainly could exclude nonpayers from 
entering the theater to enjoy a performance of Romeo and Juliet. In other 
words, the box office was and remains an important source of income for 
some creative endeavors. If distribution is no longer a concern, whether the 
exclusion of those unable or unwilling to pay for access to creative 
expression is justified as a means of providing additional financial 
incentives for creators should be an endeavor specific empirical inquiry. 
Whether the law should protect composers, musicians, poets, novelists, 
screenwriters, and motion picture producers through copyright law or 
another legal regime should be judged in light of the revenues available to 
these groups of creators from noncopyright sources. 
Once again, consider the music industry in the United States. When 
one recognizes that noncopyright sources of revenue are not only 
significant, but in many cases, the principal source of income for 
performing artists, the argument that file sharing threatens the incentives to 
create becomes much less clear. Consider the music industry in the United 
States. As illustrated by Chart 1, despite an initial increase in sales, the 
recording industry has experienced a general decline in CD sales since the 
introduction of the Internet.  
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CHART 1. 
 
 
 
Assuming that this decline is entirely the result of unauthorized 
downloads substituting for authorized sales, as opposed to the poor 
selection of artists or music by the recording labels, ineffective marketing, 
or a shift in consumer demand away from pre-recorded music to other 
forms of entertainment, this is bad news for the business of distributing 
recorded music. In contrast, the availability of unauthorized copies, 
however, appears to have had a very different impact upon the revenues 
available to the typical performing artist and consequently, the incentives 
of those performing artists. As illustrated by Chart 2, according to Pollstar, 
an industry trade publication, U.S. concert revenues have risen to record 
totals in the decade following the Internet. 
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CHART 2. 
 
 
As the limited amount of publicly available information on the 
workings of the industry suggests that live performances are the principal 
source of income for the vast majority of recording artists,48 this increase in 
concert revenues is particularly important when evaluating the impact of 
unauthorized downloading upon artists’ incentives to create music. As 
illustrated by Chart 3, the revenue available to artists’ has clearly increased 
in the decade since the introduction of the Internet.49 
 
                                                 
48 See Ku, Creative Destruction, supra note 3, at 306-09. In contrast, songwriters do earn income 
from the sale of recorded music in addition to revenues from radio play, and other sources. How 
downloading impacts CD sales and the incentives of songwriters is another empirical question that 
must be answered. 
49 These figures are based upon the RIAA reports of CD sales and Pollstar’s reports of concert 
revenues, and reported estimates that artists generally receive 12% of CD sales and 50% of concert 
revenues. See James Surowiecki, Hello, Cleveland, THE NEW YORKER, May 16, 2005, available at 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/05/16/050516ta_talk_surowiecki (last visited Aug 20, 
2007) (“An artist, if he’s lucky, gets twelve per cent of the retail price of a CD. But he doesn’t get 
any royalties until everything is paid for — studio time, packaging costs, videos — which means 
that he can sell a million records and make almost nothing. On tour, though, he often gets more 
than half of the box-office, so even if he grosses less he can profit more.”). 
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CHART 3. 
 
 
Adjusted for inflation, performing artists have enjoyed a 229% growth 
in concert revenue and a 40% growth in the combined revenue available 
from CD sales and ticket sales. Even assuming that file sharing will destroy 
all economic value in distributing CDs, we would need to determine 
whether the overall financial incentives available to artists are sufficient to 
promote the writing, recording, and performing of music. 
One possible explanation for the growth in revenues for artists is that 
file sharing is an effective form of free advertising. File sharing exposes 
new or independent artists and works to the public based upon the actual 
preferences of the public rather than what distributors guess to be the 
public’s preferences. As the chief of one independent record label described, 
is akin to “grass-roots promoters whose efforts eventually increase sales.”50 
After all, musicians have always given away music to build a fan base; they 
are just accustomed to giving it away to record labels. And, while CD sales 
have fallen since the introduction of file sharing, as discussed above 
concert revenues have broken records and the artists share of the revenue 
pie has increased significantly. While correlation is not causation, this 
degree of correlation certainly requires serious consideration. And this may 
                                                 
50 See Chris Nelson, Upstart Labels See File Sharing as Ally, Not Foe, N.Y. Times, Sep 22, 2003, 
at C1, available at http://query.nytimes.com/gst/fullpage.html?sec=technology&res=9A01EEDF1E 
3AF931A1575AC0A9659C8B63. 
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even be true for the sale of CD’s. Some studies suggest that file sharing 
may improve CD sales.51 A recent study conducted by Felix Oberholzer 
and Koleman Strumpf found that file sharing had little effect on record 
sales in general, which suggested that most file sharers “are likely 
individuals who would not have bought the album even in the absence of 
file sharing.”52 The study also found a slight positive effect for high selling 
albums.53 And, similar anecdotal evidence abounds.54 
Moreover, the assumption that people will stop buying music or other 
creative works if they can obtain it for free is not supported by experience. 
Not only do people pay for bottled water when they can get water for free, 
but people are paying to download music. To date, Apple has reportedly 
sold 2.5 billion songs through its iTunes store despite the availability of 
“free” downloads, and iTunes is only one of the many commercially 
licensed Internet music distributors. 55  Economists may explain this 
behavior as a function of opportunity costs. With all endeavors, whether 
mowing the lawn, growing food, or now downloading music, people have 
the choice of doing things themselves. That choice, however, entails certain 
costs: costs to acquire a skill, costs to acquire any necessary tools, and costs 
associated with foregoing other opportunities or engaging in other activities. 
In general, we choose to pay other people to do something we are capable 
of doing ourselves when the costs of self-help outweigh the value of doing 
it ourselves. In other words, people will pay for music if what they receive 
for their payment – convenience, reliability, and quality – is greater than 
the benefit of downloading the same music themselves. When one 
considers that the marginal cost for reproducing and distributing digital 
works is zero,56 it is not hard to imagine that some price above zero will 
satisfy all but the most indigent or disinterested customers. Provided that 
the price is right, music sales and the sales of other copyrighted works will 
                                                 
51 See, e.g., A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, 1017 (9th Cir. 2001) (noting that 
some studies suggest that file sharing increases CD sales); John Tehranian, All Rights Reserved? 
Reassessing Copyright and Patent Enforcement in the Digital Age, 72 U. CIN. L. REV. 45, 74 (2003) 
(noting recent economic literature that demonstrates that the sharing of information can generate 
increased profits); see also Reuters, Survey: Music swappers are music buyers too, May 7, 2003, 
http://www.zeropaid.com/news/2878/Music+swappers+are+music+buyers+too (noting that, while 
record labels blame the popularity of free services like KaZaa for declines in CD sales, industry 
watchers argue that declining sales are the result of fewer hit albums and a weak economy). 
52 Felix Oberholzer & Koleman Strumpf, The Effect of File Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical
 Analysis 3-4 (Mar 2004) (unpublished manuscript), http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing
_March2004.pdf (last visited Aug 20, 2007). 
53 Id. at 3. 
54 See Ku, Grokking Grokster, supra note 3, at 234. This increase in sales may be closely connected 
to the increase in concert revenues with individuals purchasing CD in the period preceding and 
following a concert. 
55 See 100 million iPods Sold (Apr 9, 2007), http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/09ipod.html 
(last visited Aug 20, 2007). 
56 See Ku, Creative Destruction, supra note 3, at 274. 
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continue to be a significant, if not greater, source of compensation to artists 
once distributors can no longer demand the lion's share. 
A growth in the revenue available to performing artists, however, does 
not necessarily lead to an increase in creativity. For example, would be 
artists may see any “losses” attributed to unauthorized reproduction and 
dissemination of their works as a deterrent or offense to their creativity. 
Likewise, the revenue available may be disproportionately awarded to 
superstars, thereby decreasing the rewards available to vast majority of 
performers or individuals with little or no interest in popular stardom. Once 
again, the empirical evidence over the last decade is quite provocative. If 
one uses U.S. copyright registrations as a measure for the creation of new 
sound recordings in the United States, the evidence suggests that during a 
period of increased “unauthorized” reproduction and distribution of sound 
recordings, the number of new works created actually increased as 
illustrated by Chart 4.  
 
CHART 4. 
 
 
So while the number of CDs sold has declined as illustrated by the 
number of CD’s shipped as reported by the RIAA, the number of new 
sound recordings created has increased over the same period of time. 
It may be suggested that because artists will avail themselves of the 
benefits of this technology and self-distribution, concerns about copyright 
may be premature because the “market” will correct itself over time. While 
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this may change the balance between creators and distributors going 
forward, it still remains an important public policy concern. Even if 
individual artists successfully take advantage of the benefits of the Internet 
and digital technology and bring their works to the public without having to 
put themselves in thrall to traditional intermediaries, applying exclusive 
rights for existing works to non-commercial public copying gives current 
copyright owning intermediaries considerable influence, if not veto power, 
over technological and economic development until their interests expire. 
Following the U.S. Copyright Term Extension Act, existing copyrights will 
not expire until seventy years after the death of the author, or in the case of 
works made for hire, 120 years after creation or ninety-five years after 
publication.57 As such, these copyright holders, many of whom have every 
incentive to hold up and block the emergence of any new world order, will 
not see their copyrights expire in our lifetime or even in this century. 
Before concluding that producers of valuable technology and the 
millions of users of those technologies should be declared criminals, any 
thoughtful economic justification for copyright must examine the complex 
role that these sources of revenue play in providing incentives to create 
works, their relationship to the incentives generated by copyright, the 
impact of file sharing on copyright and noncopyright sources of income, 
and most importantly, how file sharing impacts the decision-making 
process of would-be artists. In the case of music, assuming that individuals 
are capable of making rational fine-tuned decisions about the potential 
rewards of becoming a musician, and that financial reward is a substantial 
motive, unrestricted file sharing may have actually increased the financial 
incentives available to musicians. 
In contrast, for some creative endeavors the supplemental financial 
rewards provided by selling copies of works to the public may be essential 
in order for a market for those works to function. For example, given the 
high cost of producing a motion picture, downstream revenues from the 
sale of DVDs may be necessary to ensure investment in films, especially if 
we desire investment in “riskier” works that may not appeal to a 
mainstream audience. Likewise, while writers such as Mark Twain 
historically made money on the lecture circuit,58 if authors were dependent 
upon ticket sales alone, some might chose to continue to practice law or sell 
insurance rather than write. As an empirical matter, we simply do not know. 
Moreover, even if we assume that file sharing has some negative 
impact upon the financial incentives available for creation and that artists 
behave rationally like homo economicus, resulting in the creation of fewer 
works, we would still need to answer the difficult policy question of 
                                                 
57 See 17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000). 
58 See The Literature Network, Mark Twain – Biography and Works, http://www.online-
literature.com/twain/ (last visited Aug. 20, 2007). 
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whether encouraging the creation of additional works is worth the price of 
denying the entire public unlimited access to all the works already created 
and the works that would be created without additional restrictions. If only 
one in ten motion pictures might not be made, the price of denying the 
public access to the other nine, as well as all other motion pictures already 
in existence may simply be too high. Correspondingly, if only one in three 
books would be written, we might readily find the trade-off acceptable. 
Because distribution has dominated the analysis for hundreds of years, we 
have not confronted these difficult questions.59  
C. Alternatives to Monopoly Privileges 
Even if we conclude that additional revenues derived from the 
reproduction and distribution of copies are desirable for encouraging a 
particular creative endeavor, or because it is fair and just, copyright may no 
longer be the preferred method for generating that revenue. Within the 
community of legal scholars in the United States, there is growing support 
for creating a levy system to respond to any diminution in financial 
incentives caused by file sharing rather than enforcing exclusive rights in 
reproduction and distribution. Proposed such an alternative years ago by 
suggesting that society could resolve the digital dilemma by funding 
creation through a levy system similar to the one enacted by the Audio 
Home Recording Act of 1992.60 More recently, Neil Netanel and William 
Fisher have put forward detailed proposals of their own for similar levy 
regimes.61 Without going into the details of these proposals, the basic idea 
is straightforward. Government would tax various products and services 
used for file sharing, and distribute that revenue to the content creators.62 
(Fisher goes on to explore the costs and benefits of funding creation 
through an income tax as well.)63 Unlike traditional government support for 
the arts in which government officials determine who should receive the 
funding, funds under these proposals would be distributed on either a per 
download or per use basis, thus tying compensation to actual public 
demand.64  
While there will clearly be costs associated with administering such a 
                                                 
59  See Breyer, supra note 41 (examining whether alternative business methods could provide 
adequate financial incentives to publishers and computer programmers). 
60 Pub. L. No. 102-563, 106 Stat. 4237 (1992) (codified at 17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000)); see Ku, 
Creative Destruction, supra note 3, at 312-15. 
61  See WILLIAM W. FISHER, PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF 
ENTERTAINMENT 202 (2004); Neil Weinstock Netanel, Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to 
Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARV. J. L. & TECH. 1, 4 (2003). 
62 See Ku, Creative Destruction, supra note 3, at 312-15; FISHER, supra note 61, at 202; Netanel, 
supra note 61, at 4. 
63 See FISHER, supra note 61, at 216-17. 
64 See id. at 202-03. 
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regime, this approach has significant advantages over the traditional 
copyright regime. First, because it does not rely on a private property 
model, no one would be denied access. In other words, the entire public 
would have unlimited access to and enjoyment of every work ever created. 
Second, artists would have greater freedom because they would be less 
reliant upon intermediaries to distribute their works. Third, by distributing 
funds based upon downloads or use, consumers rather than government 
would guide investment by signaling which works merit further investment. 
Fourth, a levy would reduce or eliminate various costs associated with 
attempts to enforce copyright in a digital world. These costs include the 
high cost of enforcing copyright against millions of individual defendants, 
engaging in an ever-escalating technological arms race locking and 
unlocking such works, and deterring investment in innovation because of 
fear of secondary and vicarious liability.65 Fifth, a levy along these lines 
would avoid privacy concerns raised by current and proposed efforts to use 
copyright to create a pay-per-use regime.66 Because such a levy need only 
consider the total (actual or estimated) number of times a work was 
downloaded or used, there would be no need to determine or record the 
identity of individual users. Under such a system, Fisher writes:  
 
Consumers would pay less for more entertainment. Artists 
would be fairly compensated. The set of artists who made 
their creations available to the world at large – and 
consequently the range of entertainment products 
available to consumers – would increase. Musicians 
would be less dependent on record companies, and 
filmmakers would be less dependent on studios, for the 
distribution of their creations. Both consumers and artists 
would enjoy greater freedom to modify and redistribute 
audio and video recordings. Although the prices of 
consumer electronic equipment and broadband access 
would increase somewhat, demand for them would rise, 
thus benefiting the suppliers of those goods and services. 
Finally, society at large would benefit from a sharp 
reduction in litigation and other transaction costs.67 
 
In light of these potential benefits, the argument for maintaining the old 
world order is far from clear. 
                                                 
65 See Mark A. Lemley & R. Anthony Reese, Reducing Digital Copyright Infringement Without 
Restricting Innovation, 56 STAN. L. REV. 1345, 1349 (2004). 
66 See Julie E. Cohen, DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY TECH. L. J. 575 (2003) (discussing the 
privacy concerns raised by digital rights management technology). 
67 FISHER, supra note 61, at 203. 
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Lastly, allowing the public to reproduce and distribute creative works 
does not mean that a similar immunity should apply to individuals or 
businesses that seek to commercially reproduce and distribute creative 
works without the creator’s authorization. As the U.S. Supreme Court 
recognized in International News Service v. Associated Press, the law may 
regulate the ability of competitors to copy from one another under 
principles of unfair competition even when the general public would not be 
subject to similar restraints.68 To the extent that there is money to be made 
in the reproduction and distribution of expression, it stands to reason that 
creators should be entitled to such rewards. 
V. CONCLUSION 
There is no doubt that the CCD’s goal of promoting domestic and 
global environments that encourage the creation, dissemination, and access 
to diverse forms of cultural expression is critical in an information age. The 
challenge that lawmakers and policymakers must confront is how best to 
create that environment. This paper has focused upon one dimension of that 
question – copyright law – with its emphasis on creating and protecting 
property rights in expression as a means for creating incentives to create 
and disseminate cultural expression and how that focus can be questioned 
in light of advances in technology. I do not mean to suggest that copyright 
is the only, or even the best means for achieving the goals of the CCD, only 
that understanding the relationship between copyright, creativity, and 
technology is an important part of the discussion.  
Along these lines, several points deserve emphasis in light of the 
papers and discussions presented at this conference. First, we must be 
mindful of whose interests are being protected in the name of “promoting” 
diverse cultural expression. As the copyright and p2p problem exemplifies, 
the interests of intermediaries are often erroneously treated as the 
equivalent of the interests of creators and the public. In the context of 
global trade and the WTO, we should be similarly mindful of whose 
interests are actually being served by trade policy. Are they the interests of 
intermediaries seeking to protect themselves from global competition? If so, 
are those interests consistent with the interests of creators and the public? 
While these questions may not be relevant in a general discussion of trade, 
they become increasingly relevant when juxtaposed with a policy of 
promoting diverse cultural expression. 
                                                 
68 See Int’l News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215, 235 (1918) (recognizing a claim for 
unfair competition even in the absence of a property right in news). 
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Along these lines, the copyright example raises another important 
question for policies seeking to promote a diversity of cultural expression. 
Who defines culture? Is culture defined from the “bottom up” based upon 
the collective choices of individuals? Or, is cultural defined from the “top 
down” based upon the opinions and preferences of governmental, corporate, 
or social elites? In theory, copyright has been described as serving the 
“bottom up” or “democratic” view because it facilitates a market for 
cultural expression based upon the preferences and tastes of individuals 
rather than those of wealthy patrons or the emperor. In practice, however, 
copyright has created a regime of corporate patronage in which the 
opinions and preferences of corporations and wealthy individuals have a 
significant influence over culture because they determine what works of 
cultural expression will be disseminated to the public and on what terms. 
Changes in technology may reduce the power exercised by such 
intermediaries and connect the creators of cultural expression more directly 
with their audience, however, whether this will occur will depend, at least 
in part, upon one’s answer to normative question of who should define 
culture? 
Lastly, as my discussion of the challenges and promises technology 
poses for the creation of cultural expression hopefully makes clear, one size 
does not fit all. In the context of copyright law this means that our answer 
to whether we should continue to provide legal protection and/or how to 
provide such protection to sound records may very well be different than 
our answer for books, motion pictures, and other creative endeavors and 
works of cultural expression. Our answers will be different because the 
economics behind these different creative endeavors may differ both in 
kind and degree. As such, whether technology has eliminated the need to 
preserve shelf-space in order to promote cultural diversity will depend upon 
how we choose to fund the creation of such works. If we decide that the 
primary source of funding for motion pictures should be box office ticket 
sales rather than exclusive rights to control the digital distribution of those 
works, screen quotas will remain important. However, our answers will 
also differ from Nation to Nation, society to society, and culture to culture 
based upon how we balance the interests of creators of cultural expression 
with the interests of the public in obtaining access to that expression. While 
this diversity may be frustrating to those seeking simplicity or efficiency 
through uniformity, it is important to recognize that there will be legitimate 
differences of opinions and approaches even when the goals are the same. 
In short, global cooperation with respect to promoting diverse cultural 
expression will only be achieved when we move beyond the rhetoric of 
piracy and hegemony and separate those conflicts that are based upon 
legitimate differences in opinion on how best to achieve our shared goals 
from those generated by efforts to promote our own self-interest. 
2007] PROMOTING DIVERSE CULTURAL EXPRESSION 395 
 
References 
Books 
BETTIG, RONALD V. (1996), COPYRIGHTING CULTURE: THE 
POLITICAL ECONOMY OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, 
Boulder, CO: Westview Press. 
BOYLE, JAMES (1996), SHAMANS, SOFTWARE AND SPLEENS : LAW 
AND THE CONSTRUCTION OF THE INFORMATION SOCIETY , 
Harvard University Press. 
CONNER-SAX, KIERSTEN & ED KROL (1999), THE WHOLE 
INTERNET: THE NEXT GENERATION, Sebastopol, CA: 
O'REILLY. 
FISHER, WILLIAM W. (2004), PROMISES TO KEEP: TECHNOLOGY, 
LAW, AND THE FUTURE OF ENTERTAINMENT, Stanford, CA: 
Stanford Law and Politics. 
GOLDSTEIN, PAUL (2005), COPYRIGHT’S HIGHWAY: FROM 
GUTENBERG TO THE CELESTIAL JUKEBOX, Stanford, CA: 
Stanford Law and Politics. rev. ed. 
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE TASK FORCE (1995), 
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND THE NATIONAL 
INFORMATION INFRASTRUCTURE: THE REPORT OF THE 
WORKING GROUP ON INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY RIGHTS, 
Washington, DC: Information Infrastructure Task Force. 
POOL, ITHIEL DE SOLA (1983), TECHNOLOGIES OF FREEDOM, 
Cambridge, MA: The Belknap Press. 
LESSIG, LAWRENCE (2001), THE FUTURE OF IDEAS: THE FATE OF 
THE COMMONS IN A CONNECTED WORLD, New York: 
Random Hous. 
NATIONAL RESEARCH COUNCIL ET AL. (2000), THE DIGITAL 
DILEMMA: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY IN THE INFORMATION 
AGE, Washington, DC: National Academy Press. 
PADOVER, SAUL K. (1943), THE COMPLETE JEFFERSON, New York: 
Duell, Sloan & Pearce. 
Articles 
Barlow, John P. (1994), The Economy of Ideas, http://www.wired. 
com/wired/archive/2.03/economy.ideas.html. 
396 AJWH [VOL. 2:369 
 
Breyer, Stephen (1970), The Uneasy Case for Copyright: A Study 
of Copyright in Books, Photocopies, and Computer 
Programs, 84 HARV. L. REV. 281. 
Cohen, Julie E. (2003), DRM and Privacy, 18 BERKELEY 
TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 575.  
Demsetz, Harold (1970), The Private Production of Public Goods, 
13 THE JOURNAL OF LAW AND ECONOMICS 293.  
Fisher, William W. III (1988), Reconstructing the Fair Use 
Doctrine, 101 HARVARD LAW REVIEW 1659. 
Gordon, Wendy (1982), Fair Use as Market Failure: A Structural 
and Economic Analysis of the Betamax Case and Its 
Predecessors, 82 COLUMBIA LAW REVIEW 1600. 
Gordon, Wendy J. (1993), A Property Right in Self-Expression: 
Equality and Individualism in the Natural Law of 
Intellectual Property, 102 YALE LAW JOURNAL 1533 
Jr, Glynn S. L.,(1996) Reexamining Copyright’s Incentive-Access 
Paradigm, 49 VAND. L, REV. 483. 
Ku, Raymond S.R. (2003), Consumer Copying & Creative 
Destruction: Fair Use Beyond Market Failure, 18 
BERKELEY TECHNOLOGY LAW JOURNAL 539. 
Ku, Raymond S.R. (2005), Grokking Grokster, 2005 WISCONSIN 
LAW REVIEW 1217. 
Ku, Raymond S.R. (2002), The Creative Destruction of Copyright: 
Napster & the New Economics of Digital Technology, 69 
UNIVERSITY OF CHICAGO LAW REVIEW 263. 
Landes, William M. & Posner, Richard A. (1989), An Economic 
Analysis of Copyright Law, 18 JOURNAL OF LEGAL 
STUDIES 325. 
Lemley, Mark A. & Reese, R.A. (2004), Reducing Digital 
Copyright Infringement Without Restricting Innovation, 
56 STANFORD LAW REVIEW 1345. 
Netanel, Neil W. (2003), Impose a Noncommercial Use Levy to 
Allow Free Peer-to-Peer File Sharing, 17 HARVARD 
JOURNAL OF LAW AND TECHNOLOGY 1. 
Netanel, Neil W. (2000), Market Hierarchy and Copyright in Our 
System of Free Expression, 53 VANDERBILT LAW 
REVIEW 1879. 
2007] PROMOTING DIVERSE CULTURAL EXPRESSION 397 
 
Oberholzer, Felix & Koleman Strumpf (2004), The Effect of File 
Sharing on Record Sales: An Empirical Analysis, 
http://www.unc.edu/~cigar/papers/FileSharing_March20
04.pdf. 
Sterk, Stewart E. (1996), Rhetoric and Reality in Copyright Law, 
94 MICH L REV 1197. 
Tehranian, John (2003), All Rights Reserved? Reassessing 
Copyright and Patent Enforcement in the Digital Age, 72 
UNIVERSITY OF CINCINNATI LAW REVIEW 45. 
Yen, Alfred C. (1990), Restoring the Natural Law: Copyright as 
Labor and Possession, 51 OHIO STATE LAW JOURNAL 
517. 
Conventions 
United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization, 
Convention on the Protection and Promotion of the 
Diversity of Cultural Expressions, 18 March 2007. 
US Laws and Regulations 
U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, cl. 8 
17 U.S.C. § 102 (1996) 
17 U.S.C. § 106 (1996) 
17 U.S.C. § 302 (2000) 
17 U.S.C. §§ 1001-1010 (2000) 
Cases 
A&M Records, Inc. v. Napster, Inc., 239 F.3d 1004, (9th Cir. 
2001). 
American Geophysical Union v. Texaco Inc., 60 F.3d 913, (2d Cir. 
1994). 
Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service Co., Inc., 499 
U.S. 340, (1991). 
International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 US 215, 
(1918). 
Mazer v. Stein, 347 U.S. 201, (1954). 
Metro-Goldwyn-Mayer Studios, Inc. v. Grokster Ltd., 125 S.Ct. 
2764 (2005). 
398 AJWH [VOL. 2:369 
 
Sony Corp. of America v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 
417, (1984). 
United States v. Paramount Pictures, Inc., 334 U.S. 131, (1948). 
News 
Chris Nelson, Upstart Labels See File Sharing as Ally, Not Foe, 
N.Y. Times, Sep 22, 2003,http://query.nytimes.com/gst/f
ullpage.html?sec=technology&res=9A01EEDF1E3AF93
1A1575AC0A9659C8B63. 
Reuters, Survey: Music swappers are music buyers too, http://ww
w.zeropaid.com/news/2878/Music+swappers+are+music
+buyers+too. 
Surowiecki, James (2005), Hello, Cleveland, THE NEW YORKER, 
http://www.newyorker.com/archive/2005/05/16/050516t
a_talk_surowiecki. 
Websites 
100 million iPods Sold, http://www.apple.com/pr/library/2007/04/
09ipod.html. 
Apple Products, http://www.apple.com/macmini/. 
Collective legal documents and information, http://www.eff.org/I
P/P2P/riaa-v-thepeople.php. 
HTTP Overtakes P2P Traffic, http://www.dslreports.com/showne
ws/85022. 
The Literature Network, Mark Twain--Biography and Works, http:
//www.online-literature.com/twain/. 
